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We tackle the issue of the possible instability of the Kaleckian distribution and growth 
model and the consequences for the endogeneity of the equilibrium rate of capacity 
utilization and for the paradox of thrift and the paradox of costs. Distinguishing 
between Keynesian and Harrodian instability, we review various mechanisms that 
have been proposed to tame Harrodian instability while bringing back the rate of 
utilization to its normal rate. We find that the mechanisms that have been suggested 
are far from being convincing. We thus review some approaches arguing that the 
adjustment towards a predetermined normal rate should not be expected at all, either 
because the normal rate reacts to the actual rate, or because of other constraints on the 
behaviour of entrepreneurs. We conclude that Kaleckian models are more flexible 




JEL code: E12, E20, O41 







Eckhard Hein  Marc Lavoie  Till van Treeck 
eckhard-hein@boeckler.de marc.lavoie@uottawa.ca till-van-treeck@boeckler.de 
Macroeconomic Policy Institute 
(IMK) at Hans Boeckler 
Foundation  
Hans-Boeckler-Straße 39  
40476 Duesseldorf  
Germany  
Department of Economics 
University of Ottawa 
55 Laurier east 
Ottawa (Ontario) 
Canada K1N 6N5 
 
Macroeconomic Policy Institute 
(IMK) at Hans Boeckler 
Foundation  
Hans-Boeckler-Straße 39  
40476 Duesseldorf  
Germany  
 
                                                 
# This work started when Eckhard Hein and Till van Treeck were visiting Marc Lavoie in Ottawa in 
May/June 2008. They would like to thank the University of Ottawa for its hospitality and the IMK at 
Hans Boeckler Foundation for the supply of travel funding. The paper was presented at the 2008 
conference of the Research Network Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policies, in Berlin, 
Germany.   1
1. Introduction 
 
The Kaleckian model of growth, as initially suggested by Del Monte (1975), and then 
put forward by Rowthorn (1981), Taylor (1983), Amadeo (1986) and Dutt (1990), has 
progressively become quite popular among heterodox economists concerned with 
macroeconomics and effective demand issues. The model, in its simplest versions, is 
made up of three equations that involve income distribution, saving, and investment, 
the latter depending among other things on the rate of capacity utilization. One of the 
reasons of its success is that the model, in contrast to the old Cambridge growth 
model, avoids contradictions as it moves from the short run to the long run. In the 
short run, Keynesians usually assume that most of the adjustments are done through 
quantities – the rate of capacity utilization with a given stock of capital – and hence 
there is some consistency in arguing, as do the Kaleckians, that the rate of capacity 
utilization will play a role as well in the medium- and long-run adjustments. In 
particular, the model has shown that short-run macroeconomic paradoxes, such as the 
paradox of thrift or the paradox of costs, whereby a decrease in the propensity to save 
or an increase in real wages leads to an increase in output, could be extended to the 
long run, as reflected by an increase in growth rates and an increase in realized profit 
rates.  
  As argued in Lavoie (2006), the model has proven to be highly flexible and 
has generated substantive interaction between economists of different economic 
traditions, with various versions having been developed by post-Keynesian, 
Structuralist, Sraffian and Marxist economists alike. One version of the Kaleckian 
model that has been particularly attractive has been that of Bhaduri and Marglin 
(1990) and that of Kurz (1990), both papers showing that with an extended investment 
function the economy could be either wage-led or profit-led, depending on the 
configuration of the parameters. Various growth regimes could thus arise from this 
modified investment function or from other extensions of the model. These two 
papers have given rise to a substantial empirical literature that purports to verify 
whether rising real wages or rising wage shares could be conducive to faster economic 
growth, thus suggesting a possible way out for economies suffering from slow growth 
and high unemployment rates.
1 
  As the Kaleckian model has become the source of an ever-growing literature, 
some authors have started to doubt its relevance, by questioning the stability of the 
model (Dallery, 2007; Skott, 2008A, 2008B, 2008C; Allain, 2008). Kaleckians 
usually assume Keynesian stability, and draw policy implications based on the 
comparative analysis that follows from this stability condition – that is, they assume 
that changes in rates of utilization have a larger impact on the saving function than 
they do on the investment function. However, some critics doubt that this Keynesian 
stability condition holds. 
  There is a somewhat related problem, associated with Harrodian instability, 
which is also underlined by critics. A main characteristic of the Kaleckian model, 
perhaps its key characteristic, is that the rate of capacity utilization is endogenous, 
both in the short and in the long run, a feature with which Joseph Steindl (1990, p. 
429) himself agreed. This feature of the model has been picked up and questioned 
from the very beginning, mainly by some Sraffian and Marxist trained authors (e.g., 
Committeri, 1986; Auerbach and Skott, 1988; Duménil and Lévy, 1995). Their 
                                                 
1 See the literature review and the estimations for several countries by Hein and Vogel (2008) and the 
results in Naastepad and Storm (2007), Stockhammer and Ederer (2008), and Stockhammer, Onaran 
and Ederer (2009), among others.   2
complaint is that the rate of utilization cannot remain unconstrained in the long run. 
Whereas in the short run it can move away from the normal degree of capacity 
utilization – also called the standard rate or the target rate of capacity utilization – 
there ought to be some mechanism bringing back the actual rate of capacity utilization 
towards its normal rate. The main point is that if the rate of capacity utilization is 
higher (lower) than its normal rate in the long run, then the rate of accumulation 
cannot remain constant, and must drift up (down). In this view, the long-run 
Kaleckian (pseudo) equilibrium is not sustainable.
2 A problem of Harrodian instability 
arises, which Kaleckians are said to ignore.  
  The purpose of the present paper is to tackle the issue of the possible 
instability of the Kaleckian model. In the next section, we will try to distinguish 
carefully between Keynesian and Harrodian instability, while showing that, at the 
empirical level, these two problems may be hard to disentangle in practice. In the 
third section, we discuss the various mechanisms, and their objections, that have been 
proposed to tame Harrodian instability while bringing back the rate of utilization in 
line with its unique normal rate. In the fourth section, we discuss alternative 
mechanisms that tend to retain the main Kaleckian features, in particular the long-run 
endogeneity of the rate of capacity utilization.  
 
 
2. Keynesian versus Harrodian instability 
 
While various authors have questioned the stability of the Kaleckian model, they have 
not always been clear on whether they meant that the Kaleckian model was subjected 
to Keynesian instability or to Harrodian instability. In this section, we want to clarify 
these two distinct forms of instability, although we shall end up proposing that these 
two kinds of instability may be rather difficult to distinguish in practice. To facilitate 
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Equation (1) is the distribution or pricing equation, which says that the realized net 
profit rate r depends on the realized rate of capacity utilization u, on the gross profit 
margin m, and on the capital to capacity ratio v. The same distribution equation can 
also be rewritten in terms of the normal profit rate rn and the normal rate of capacity 
utilization un. The saving function g
s is the standard classical saving equation, which 
assumes away saving out of wages, with a propensity to save out of profits equal to sp. 
Finally, equation (3) is the investment function, where the rate of capital accumulation 
is said to depend on a parameter γ, which represents some assessment of the trend rate 
of growth of sales. Thus, whenever the rate of capacity utilization is above its normal 
rate, firms attempt to bring back capacity towards its normal rate by accumulating 
capital at a rate that exceeds the assessed trend growth rate of sales. But unless there is 
                                                 
2 The main characteristics of the Kaleckian model, the paradox of thrift and the possibility of a paradox 
of costs in the long run are therefore questioned as well.   3
some kind of fluke, the actual and the normal rates of capacity utilization will differ in 
this Kaleckian model without any further adjustment. That is the reason why un is 
omitted from the investment function in many simple versions of the Kaleckian 
model. 
For the goods market equilibrium of the model (g
s = g
i) the following 
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2.1 Keynesian instability 
 
Keynesian stability in this model requires that investment is not too sensitive to 
changes in the rate of capacity utilization. The slope of the investment function must 
be smaller than that of the saving function, which means that condition (5) needs to be 
fulfilled: 
 
(5)  u p v
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The issue of short-run stability can be seen in two ways. One possibility is to assume a 
disequilibrium mechanism, whereby the level of output is given in the ultra short 
period, with firms adjusting the level of output to the disequilibrium in the goods 
market, that is the discrepancy between desired investment and saving. Thus firms 
increase the degree of capacity utilization whenever aggregate demand exceeds 
aggregate supply, in which case we have: 
 
(6) 0 ), ( > − = μ μ Δ
s i g g u . 
 
The Keynesian stability case is illustrated in Figure 1: The economy moves towards 
the equilibrium locus, which is necessarily wage-led in this simple variant of the 
model (the locus has an inverse relationship between rates of utilization and profit 
shares).
3 In the instability case, shown in Figure 2, the equilibrium locus is necessarily 
profit-led in the simple model (the locus has a positive relationship between rates of 
                                                 






















, a wage-led regime and hence the paradox of costs. In the stable case, the paradox of thrift 

















.   5
utilization and profit shares).
4 However, if there were an additional price mechanism, 
as discussed by Bruno (1999) and Bhaduri (2008), with profit margins rising when 
aggregate demand exceeds aggregate supply, it could possibly bring back the 
economy towards equilibrium, as shown with arrow ES in Figure 2, in contrast to 
arrow EU which shows an unstable process in the face of changing profit margins. 
Another way to see Keynesian instability is to imagine a pure adjustment 
process, assuming that firms are always able to adjust production to sales within the 
period, thus assuming that the goods market is in equilibrium in each period. It can 
also be conveniently assumed that firms make their investment decisions on the basis 
of an expected rate of capacity utilization u
e, which is set at the beginning of the 
investment period (Amadeo, 1987). In this case, the investment function needs to be 
slightly modified to: 
 
(3A)  ( ) 0 , , > − + = u n
e
u
i u u g γ γ γ γ .  
 
The rate of utilization that will be realized in each period will thus be u
















The expected rate of utilization may thus be unequal to the short-period equilibrium 
rate, so that we can envisage an adjusting mechanism, such that:  
 
(8)   0 ), ( > − = θ θ Δ
e K e u u u . 
 
With Keynesian stability, as illustrated with Figure 3, the economy will be brought 
towards the equilibrium utilization rate in equation (4). 
  Figure 4 illustrates Keynesian instability. Entrepreneurs overestimate the 
equilibrium rate of capacity utilization (u
e > u*), but the realized short-run rate of 
utilization is even higher than the overestimated rate (u
K > u
e), so that entrepreneurs 
are induced to raise the expected rate of utilization even more, thus moving away 
from the long-run equilibrium u*. There is some similitude with Harrodian instability, 
in the sense that here we have u
K > u
e > u*, whereas Harrodian instability is often 
interpreted as g
K > g
e > gw, that is the growth rate of sales ends up being higher than 
the expected growth rate of sales when the latter exceeds Harrod’s warranted growth 
rate (Sen, 1970, p. 12). 
                                                 
















, Keynesian instability from equation (4) 





, and hence a profit-led regime. The paradox of costs is gone. The same is true 









































2.2 Harrodian instability 
 
Harrodian instability, however, is not the same thing as Keynesian instability. The 
latter arises when the investment function is steeper than the saving function. In our 
simple Kaleckian model, Harrodian instability arises because the γ parameter of the 
investment function is unstable and rises (decreases) whenever the rate of capacity 
utilization exceeds (is below) its normal rate. Thus one may have simultaneously   7
Keynesian stability and Harrodian instability. Formally, critics of the Kaleckian 
model represent Harrodian instability as a difference or a differential equation, where 
the change in the rate of accumulation is a function of the discrepancy between the 
actual and the normal rates of capacity utilization (Skott, 2008B; Skott and Ryoo, 
2008). 
 
(9)   0 ), * ( > − = θ θ Δ n
i u u g .  
 
But what this really means in terms of our little Kaleckian model is that the parameter 
γ gets shifted as long as the actual and normal rates of capacity utilization are unequal:  
 
(10)   0 ), * ( > − = θ θ γ Δ n u u .  
 
The reason for this is that in equation (3) the γ parameter can be interpreted as the 
assessed trend growth rate of sales, or as the expected secular rate of growth of the 
economy. When the actual rate of utilization is consistently higher than the normal 
rate (u* > un), this implies that the growth rate of the economy is consistently above 
the assessed secular growth rate of sales (g* > γ). Thus, as long as entrepreneurs react 
to this in an adaptive way, they should eventually make a new, higher, assessment of 
the trend growth rate of sales, thus making use of a larger γ parameter in the 
investment function. 
  Equation (10) may be interpreted as a slow process. In words, after a certain 
number of periods during which the achieved rate of utilization exceeds its normal 
rate, the investment function starts shifting up, thus leading to ever-rising rates of 
capacity utilization, and hence to an unstable process. This is illustrated with the help 
of Figure 5. Once the economy achieves a long-run solution with a higher than normal 
rate of utilization, say at u1 > un, (after a decrease in the propensity to save in Figure 
5), the constant in the investment function moves up from γ0 to γ2 and γ3, thus pushing 
further up the rate of capacity utilization to u2 and u3, with accumulation achieving the 
rates g2 and g3, and so on. Thus, according to some of its critics, the Kaleckian model 
gives a false idea of what is really going on in the economy, because the equilibrium 


















Critics have not always been clear on whether they mean that the Kaleckian model is 
subjected to a problem of Keynesian instability or that of Harrodian instability. We 
hope that the present section clarifies the difference between the two kinds of 
instability. However, in practical terms, it may be quite difficult to differentiate 
between the two. Suppose that the economy runs on Keynesian stability, but faces 
Harrodian instability, as in Figure 5. An econometrician observing actual data might 
measure situations reflected by points A and C in Figure 5, which represent some of 
the different intersections of the saving function with the shifting investment function. 
Thus even though the true slope of the investment function is given by the AB line, 
what is actually measured, by adding lagged effects, may instead be the larger slope 
AC. If the Harrodian instability effect is strong enough, the slope of the apparent 
investment function will be very close to that of the saving function, indicating near 
Keynesian instability. Thus it will be difficult to distinguish between Keynesian and 
Harrodian instability in practice. In other words, it will be difficult to distinguish 
between relatively high γu parameters and a shifting γ parameter. 
  Whether the simple Kaleckian model ‘suffers’ from Keynesian instability or 
Harrodian instability (with Keynesian stability), the consequences are nearly identical 
when the economy is subjected to a decrease in the propensity to save or a decrease in 
the profit margin. With Harrodian instability, there will be a succession of equilibria 
with ever-rising rates of accumulation and capacity utilization. With Keynesian 
instability, the new equilibrium is at a lower rate of utilization and a lower rate of 
accumulation; but since the economy is moving away from this equilibrium, the actual 
rates of utilization and accumulation are ever rising (as indicated by the arrow in 
Figure 4), as in the case of Harrodian instability.  
Thus, in what follows, we consider that entrepreneurs react with enough inertia 
to generate Keynesian stability.
5 When rates of utilization rise above their normal 
                                                 
5 This assumption is similar to what Skott (2008A, 2008B) assumes in his critique of the Kaleckian 
investment function and in his alternative Harrodian model. Dallery’s (2007) point instead is that the 
Kaleckian model either faces Keynesian instability or yields implausible equilibrium solutions. The 
answer to this is that one cannot expect a simple model that only tracks a couple of variables, without   9
rates (or fall below their normal rates), entrepreneurs take a wait and see attitude, not 
modifying their parametric behaviour immediately, until they are convinced that the 
discrepancy is there to stay. Thus, in what follows, we consider that the main issue at 
stake is the sustainability of a discrepancy between actual and normal rates of capacity 
utilization, as well as the related problem of Harrodian instability. 
 
 
3. Long-run stability of normal utilization with short-run Harrodian instability: 
Keynesian in the short run and Classical in the long run? 
 
Various mechanisms have been proposed to bring back the rate of capacity utilization 
to its normal (given) level. In the present section, we explore these mechanisms and 
provide possible criticisms. 
 
 
3.1 Robinson, Kaldor and the Cambridge price mechanism: Retaining the 
paradox of thrift in the long run 
 
It is well-known that in the early Cambridge growth and distribution model, more 
specifically that of Joan Robinson (1956, 1962), ‘the key assumption is that the rate of 
capacity utilization varies on the path between steady-state configurations, but not 
across steady-growth states’ (Marglin, 1984, p. 125). In other words, the early 
Cambridge growth model of Robinson and Kaldor assumed the existence of a long-
run mechanism – a price mechanism – that is driving back the rate of utilization 
towards its normal value. This puzzled early American post-Keynesians, most notably 
Paul Davidson, who even understood the Cambridge model as involving a short-run 
income distribution mechanism:  
 
‘In Joan Robinson’s model, if realised aggregate demand is below 
expected demand, then it is assumed that competition brings down 
market prices (and profit margins) at the normal or standard volume 
of output.’ (Davidson, 1972, p. 125) 
 
With the Davidson interpretation of the Cambridge price mechanism, we have the 
following differential equation,  
 
(11)   0 ), ( > − = μ μ Δ
s i
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and where u = un at all times. 
  With the Marglin interpretation of the Cambridge price mechanism, we have 
instead differential equation (12) or (12A): 
 
(12) 0 ), * ( > − = ϕ ϕ Δ n n u u r , 







                                                                                                                                            
government and external sectors as well as rudimentary financial relations, to reflect the complexities 
of the real world. For instance, one does also not expect the simple income-multiplier model to mimic 
real-world data.   10
 
The Marglin interpretation can itself be assessed in two different ways. Looking at 
equation (12), the Cambridge price mechanism implies that profit margins and hence 
prices relative to wages rise as long as the actual rate of utilization exceeds the normal 
rate of utilization, in an effort to bring the rate of capacity utilization to its normal 
value. Looking now at equation (12A), the Cambridge price mechanism can be 
understood as an adaptive mechanism, whereby firms raise profit margins, and hence 
what they consider to be the normal profit rate, whenever the actual profit rate 
exceeds the previously assessed normal profit rate. This brings back the rate of 
capacity utilization towards its normal value as a side effect. 
  A key feature of the Robinsonian Cambridge model is the paradox of thrift. A 
decrease in the propensity to save leads to a higher rate of accumulation and a higher 
profit rate, even though the economy comes back to what the Sraffians have called a 
fully-adjusted position, that is, back to its normal rate of capacity utilization (Vianello, 
1985). But this result depends on the specific investment function proposed by 
Robinson (1956, 1962). As is well-known, her proposed investment function depends 
on the expected profit rate, itself being determined by past realized profit rates, so 
that, as a simplification we may write: 
 
(3B) 0 , , > + = r r
i r g γ γ γ γ .  
 
With equations (1), (2), and (3B), Keynesian stability requires the following 
condition: 
 
(13)  r p s γ > . 
 
Even if output remains at its normal level, with prices supporting the full weight of 
adjustment, the stability condition will still be given by equation (13). Finally, since 
















we see that condition (13) insures that the actual rate of utilization will converge to its 
normal value whenever it exceeds it. Indeed, if u > un, equation (12) tells us that the 
normal profit rate rn will be increased. This will lead to a reduction in the actual rate 
of utilization provided the denominator of equation (14) is positive, that is, provided 
stability condition (13) is fulfilled. 
  The effects of a reduction in the propensity to save are shown in Figure 6. The 
equilibrium accumulation rate moves from g0 to g1 while the rate of utilization slides 
up from un to u1, (in the Marglin interpretation), thus allowing the profit rate to rise 
from r0 to r1. With above-normal rates of utilization and above normal profit rates, 
profit margins rise. As a result, the profit curve PC, as given by equation (1A), rotates 
down in the lower part of Figure 6, bringing back the actual rate of utilization towards 
un. But this change in the components of the profit rate has no impact on the 
Cambridge investment function (3B), so that the growth rate and the profit rate remain 
at their higher values, g1 and r1. Despite the fully-adjusted position, the paradox of 


















However, if we combine the Cambridge price mechanism with the standard Kaleckian 
investment function, given by equation (3), then the paradox of thrift also vanishes in 
the long run. We leave to readers to draw the graph that corresponds to the following 
explanation. Through the decrease in the propensity to save, the saving function 
rotates downward, thus generating faster accumulation and higher rates of utilization. 
However, the rising profit margins will lead to a countervailing upward rotation of the 
saving function, and since the profit margin has no direct effect on investment in this 
model, the rate of accumulation goes back to where it came from. 
  Although several post-Keynesian authors have picked up some form or 
another of the Cambridge price mechanism – authors such as G.C. Harcourt (1972, p. 
211), Adrian Wood (1975), Alfred Eichner (1976) and Nicholas Kaldor (1985, p. 51) 
have argued that oligopolistic firms raise profit margins when faced with fast sales 
growth and high rates of capacity utilization – other post-Keynesians have been 
critical of the mechanism.
6 Besides Davidson’s (1972) annoyance with the Cambridge 
price mechanism, Steindl (1979, p. 6), Garegnani (1992, p. 63) and Kurz (1994) have 
argued that rising profit margins were unlikely to be associated with high rates of 
capacity utilization, and hence with low unemployment and stronger labour 
bargaining power. If this is so, the Cambridge price mechanism would have to be 
replaced by what we can call a Radical (or Goodwin) price and distribution 
mechanism, whereby profit margins decline when rates of capacity utilization are high 
and unemployment is low, a possibility also recently underlined by Bhaduri (2008).
7 
This Radical distribution mechanism assumes that the employment rate starts to rise 
                                                 
6 Sraffians have also been highly critical of this mechanism, as it implies that income distribution is 
determined by the rate of accumulation, with higher normal profit rates being tied to faster 
accumulation. This is what the Sraffians call the Cambridge theory of distribution. Some Sraffians 
claim instead that the normal rate of profit is essentially determined by the rate of interest, as argued by 
Pivetti (1985). Other Sraffians, however, such as Schefold (1989, p. 324), take a more eclectic view, 
arguing that the normal profit rate is influenced by both the interest rate and the growth rate.  
7 See also in a somewhat different framework Hein and Stockhammer (2007, 2008).   12
(fall) when u* positively (negatively) deviates from un. This requires that the 
associated accumulation and growth rate has to exceed (fall short of) the growth rate 
of the labour force.  
  Within the present model, or within the Robinsonian model, the Radical price 
and distribution mechanism would lead the economy away from the normal rate of 
capacity utilization. One would need a different model, that incorporates an 
investment function where capital accumulation is a positive function of the normal 
profit rate, as in the Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) or in the Kurz (1990) models, for 
such a Radical price and distribution mechanism to be able to bring back the economy 
towards the given normal rate of capacity utilization, at least for some parameter 
configurations (Stockhammer, 2004). 
  In the case where high rates of capacity utilization and high employment rates 
would induce strong labour unions to flex their muscles and bargain for reduced profit 
shares that would be resisted by firms, a price-wage-price spiral would ensue with 
more or less stable income shares. This is Joan Robinson’s ‘inflation barrier’. 
Accelerating inflation would then require the introduction of economic policy 
responses aiming at the elimination of unexpected inflation. We will discuss these 




3.2 The Shaikh I solution: the retention ratio as stabilizer, rotating back the 
saving function and removing the paradox of thrift  
 
Anwar Shaikh is a Marxist economist who has long defended a classical approach or 
what he has also called a Harrodian approach. In a recent contribution, Shaikh 
(2007A) proposes a new mechanism which would drive the economy towards the 
normal rate of utilization in the long run, as desired by many Marxist and Sraffian 
critiques of the Kaleckian model, while safeguarding some Keynesian or Kaleckian 
features. Shaikh (2007A, p. 4) claims that ‘this classical synthesis allows us to 
preserve central Keynesian arguments such as the dependence of savings on 
investment and the regulation of investment on expected profitability, without having 
to claim that actual capacity utilization will persistently differ from the rate desired by 
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The saving equation (2A) is new and simply reflects the fact that saving in modern 
economies is made up of two components. The first component corresponds to 
retained earnings, here represented in growth terms by the term sfr, with sf standing 
for the retention ratio of firms on profits. The second component assumes that   13
households save a proportion sh of their wage and distributed profit income.
8 
Investment equation (3C) is a specific version of the more general form given by 
equation (3). As in the standard Kaleckian model, there is a catch-up term based on 
the discrepancy between actual and normal rates of utilization. But the equation also 
borrows from the Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) model, by making investment a 
function of profitability, as measured by the normal rate of profit, that is, the profit 
rate at the normal rate of capacity utilization.
9 The introduction of normal profitability 
in the investment function is fully in line with arguments previously made by 
Sraffians (Vianello, 1989; Kurz, 1990, 1994; Lavoie, 1995A, p. 797).  
  Shaikh’s original proposition is that the retention ratio of firms, sf, will react to 
a discrepancy between the current rate of capacity utilization and the normal rate of 
capacity utilization, and hence, between the actual rate of accumulation and the rate of 
accumulation induced by normal profitability. He suggests the following equation: 
 
(15)   0 ), * ( > − = ρ ρ Δ n f u u s . 
 
The consequences of such a differential equation are shown in Figure 7. The economy 
is initially at its normal rate of capacity utilization un and at the rate of growth g0. Let 
us then imagine an increase in animal spirits, which in the present model can be 
proxied by an increase in the value of the γr parameter; for a given normal rate of 
profit, entrepreneurs decide to accumulate at a faster pace. As a result, on the basis of 
Keynesian dynamics, the economy moves up to a rate of utilization u1 and a rate of 
accumulation  g1. As the slowly-moving adjustment process suggested by Shaikh 
proceeds, the retention ratio of firms goes up, pushing upwards the saving function 
until finally the economy is back to the normal rate of capacity utilization un. Still, 
despite this, the economy in the new fully-adjusted position has a rate of accumulation 
g2, which is superior to the initial rate g0. 
                                                 
8 See Lavoie (1998, p. 420) for instance. According to Robinson (1962, p. 38), ‘the most important 
distinction between types of income is that between firms and households’. 
9 Thus, as in this model, the paradox of costs may or may not hold, thus giving rise to wage-led or 












We may thus conclude that, indeed, saving depends on investment in this model – a 
Keynesian feature – despite actual rates of capacity utilization being brought back to 
their normal values. However, the paradox of thrift and the paradox of costs are gone 
in the fully-adjusted positions. A decrease in the propensity to save of households will 
generate a compensating rise in the retention ratio of firms, with no change in the 
long-run rate of accumulation. As to the paradox of costs, an increase in the normal 
profit rate, and hence a fall in real wages, necessarily leads to a higher rate of 
accumulation in fully-adjusted positions, at least in the case of Keynesian stability. 
  This can be readily seen by going back to equation (3C) and assuming that the 
economy has reached its fully-adjusted position, such that u* = un. Because the saving 
function adjusts to the investment function, as shown in Figure 7, the long-run value 
of the rate of accumulation is entirely determined by the investment equation, so that 
the fully-adjusted rate of growth depends positively on animal spirits, proxied by γr, 
and on the normal profit rate. In the long run, we have: 
 
(16)  n rr g γ = * *.  
 
The only remaining issue is whether one can provide economic justifications for 
equation (15). A possible one is a ratchet effect, whereby firms set dividends on the 
basis of normal profits, retaining an ever-larger proportion of their profits when rates 
of capacity utilization exceed their normal rate. But this mechanism is far from 
obvious. It is easier to believe that firms have a higher retention ratio, instead of a 
rising retention ratio, when rates of utilization are above normal. Why would firms 
keep raising their retention ratio when rates of utilization are constant or falling, even 
though they exceed the normal rate? A similar objection is made by Skott (2008A), 
who questions the relevance of this mechanism. Finally, taking a more empirical point 
of view, Dallery and van Treeck (2008) argue that under the current paradigm of 
shareholder value orientation, managers may not be able to change the retention ratio 
on the basis of the discrepancy between the actual and the normal rates of capacity   15
utilization, because the decision to distribute profits is likely to be determined by the 
shareholders’ claims on profitability.   
 
 
3.3 The Duménil and Lévy mechanism: Government/monetary authorities get 
scared and economic policies shift the investment function downwards 
 
In the previous two subsections, we examined mechanisms that relied on rotations of 
the saving curve to bring back the economy to the normal rate of capacity utilization. 
In what follows, the mechanisms at work rely on shifts of the investment curve. 
 
 
3.3.1 The Duménil and Lévy model 
 
Duménil and Lévy (1995, 1999) have long been arguing that Keynesian economists 
are mistaken in applying to the long run results that arise from the short run. Their 
claim, in short, is that one should be Kaleckian or Keynesian in the short run, but 
classical in the long run. What they mean by this is that, in the long run, the economy 
will be brought back to normal rates of utilization – fully-adjusted positions as the 
Sraffians would say – and that in the long run classical economics will be relevant 
again. Put briefly, this implies that in the long run a lower propensity to save will 
drive down the rate of growth of the economy, and that a lower normal profit rate 
(that is higher real wages and a lower profit share, for a given technology), will also 
drive down the rate of accumulation. These authors thus reject the paradox of thrift 
and the paradox of costs, with the latter implying that a reduction in profit margins 
leads to a higher realized profit rate.  
  The Duménil and Lévy (1999) model, just like the Skott (2008A, 2008B, 
2008C) and Shaikh II models that we will examine later, all negate Kaleckian results 
by incorporating a mechanism that leads to a downward shift of the investment 
function as long as the rate of utilization exceeds its normal value (a mechanism that 
reduces the value taken by the γ parameter in investment function (3)). While 
Duménil and Lévy (1999) do not necessarily tackle Harrodian instability, they have 
pointed out in a number of other works that they consider that the economy is 
unstable in dimension, meaning that if market forces were left unhampered, real 
growth rates and utilization rates would not remain stable around some short-run 
equilibria, but would tend either to rise or to drop.   
  Duménil and Lévy (1999) provide a simple mechanism that ought to tame 
instability in dimension and bring back the economy to normal rates of capacity 
utilization. They consider that monetary policy is that mechanism. Their model, as 
shown by Lavoie (2003) and Lavoie and Kriesler (2007), is strongly reminiscent of 
the New Consensus model (NCM), where properly conducted monetary policy is the 
means by which the economy is brought back to potential output. There is also a great 
deal of resemblance with Joan Robinson’s inflation barrier and the reaction of the 
monetary authorities that she describes (1956, p. 238; 1962, p. 60).
10 We can write 
their model as equations (1), (2), and (3), with the addition of equation (17): 
                                                 
10 Joan Robinson’s views go as far back as 1937; ‘The chief preoccupation of the [monetary] 
authorities is to prevent the rapid rise in prices which sets in when unemployment falls very low, and 
the fear of this evil seems to be far more present in their minds than fear of the evils of unemployment. 
As things work out the chief function of the rate of interest is to prevent full employment from ever 
being attained’ (Robinson, 1937, p. 79).   16
 
(17)  () 0 , > − − = χ χ γ Δ n u u . 
 
Equation (17) tells us, in a reduced form, that monetary authorities will tighten 
monetary policy as long as the actual rate of capacity utilization exceeds its normal 
value, for instance by raising real interest rates. Presumably, the monetary authorities 
may fear inflation whenever rates of utilization are too high. As a result, the 
investment component that does not depend on rates of utilization, measured by γ, 
gets gradually reduced, until the actual and the normal rates of capacity utilization are 
equated. 
  This is illustrated in Figure 8. Suppose that this economy is subjected to a 
Keynesian adjustment mechanism, and that inflation kicks off with a lag. A decrease 
in the propensity to save will rotate the saving function downwards, bringing the rate 
of capacity utilization from un to u1. This generates inflationary pressures, which 
induce the central bank to raise real interest rates. These will keep on rising as long as 
inflation is not brought back to zero. As a consequence, the investment function g
i 
shifts down gradually. It will stop shifting only when it hits back the normal rate of 
utilization  un. The end result, however, as can be read off Figure 8, is that the 













The lesson drawn from this graph is that the economy might be demand-led in the 
short run, but in the long run it is supply-led. In the long run, the investment adjusts to 
the saving function, so that the growth rate is determined by the saving function, 
calculated at the normal rate of capacity utilization, and hence calculated at the 
normal profit rate. In the long run we have: 
 
(18)  n pr s g = * *.   
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Thus, a reduction in sp or rn, in the propensity to save or in the normal profit rate, 
induces a slowdown of the rate of accumulation in the long run. The paradoxes of 
thrift and of costs are gone. Over the long run, the economy is necessarily profit-led. 
Despite its seducing simplicity, the Duménil and Lévy model suffers from 
major shortcomings. First, it has to be assumed that a deviation of u from un is indeed 
associated with rising or falling prices/inflation. Duménil and Lévy do not present any 
precise rationale for this.
11 If we assume that inflation is of the conflicting claims 
type, their analysis supposes a rising Phillips curve in unexpected inflation and 
employment/utilization space. The ‘normal’ rate of utilization is hence associated with 
what others have dubbed to be a NAICU (a non-accelerating inflation rate of capacity 
utilization, as in Corrado and Mattey (1997)), in analogy with the NAIRU (non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment), or else a SICUR (a steady-inflation 
capacity utilization rate, as in McElhattan (1978)) or a SIRCU (a stable inflation rate 
of capacity utilization, as in Hein (2006B)). However, if the Phillips curve has a 
horizontal segment, the NAICU, or what Duménil and Lévy call the ‘normal’ rate of 
utilization can take a range of potential values. Within this range, the ‘normal’ rate is 
determined by the goods-market equilibrium and is hence endogenous with respect to 




3.3.2 A modified Kaleckian model that takes interest payments into 
consideration 
 
Even if the Duménil and Lévy assumption regarding the relationship between capacity 
utilization and inflation holds, it is not clear at all that the adjustment towards the 
‘normal’ rate will take place in the way they describe. To see this, let us take into 
account the effects of unexpected inflation and of changes in the monetary policy 
instrument – the nominal interest rate – on income distribution, saving and 
investment. In order to capture these effects, we have to modify our small Kaleckian 
model, now made up of the following three equations:
13 
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Equation (1A) includes the possibility that the mark-up of firms and hence their 
‘normal’ rate of profit may be elastic with respect to their real interest payments 
relative to the capital stock, i.e., the product of the real interest rate (i) and the debt-to-
capital ratio (λ). The real interest rate is given by the nominal interest rate, mainly 
                                                 
11 On the one hand, Duménil and Lévy argue that in their view changes in prices are a function of 
supply-demand disequilibria. On the other hand, they consider their analysis as ‘reminiscent of Joan 
Robinson’s inflation barrier’ (Duménil and Lévy, 1999, p. 699) which indicates that they consider 
inflation to be the outcome of unresolved distribution conflict. 
12 See Hein (2006A, 2006B, 2008, pp. 133-167), Hein and Stockhammer (2007, 2008), and Kriesler 
and Lavoie (2007) for models incorporating a Phillips curve with a horizontal segment. 
13 See Hein (2006A, 2006B, 2008, pp. 133-167) and Hein and Stockhammer (2007, 2008) for more 
elaborated models.   18
determined by central bank policies, corrected for inflation. Now, perceived 
permanent changes in the rate of interest and in the debt-to-capital ratio of firms may 
induce them to increase the mark-up. This is because the mark-up on variable costs 
has to cover interest costs in the long run, although we may still consider the mark-up 
to be interest inelastic in the short run. 
  Saving function (2B) arises from the distinction between the retained profits of 
firms, which are saved by definition, and saving out of rentiers’ income. We assume 
that the capital stock is financed by accumulated retained earnings, on the one hand, 
and by bond issues, held by rentiers households, on the other. The saving rate in 
equation (2B) is therefore given by the rate of profit minus rentier income, plus saving 
out of rentier income. The latter depend on relative interest payments (iλ) and the 
propensity to save out rentiers’ income (sz).  
  Finally, the Kaleckian investment function, now given by equation (3D), has 
been modified by introducing the negative effect of relative interest payments by 
firms. Following Kalecki’s (1937, 1954, pp. 91-95) ‘principle of increasing risk’, 
distributed profits have a negative effect on the investment of firms because they 
diminish their internal means of finance for long-term investment, and also reduce 
their access to external finance, due to incomplete capital markets.  
  From equations (2B) and (3D) we obtain the goods-market equilibrium rate of 
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Furthermore, a simple conflicting-claims model of inflation can be described by the 
following equations: 
 
(20)  0 , 0 , 1 0 1 0 ≥ > + = m m i m m m
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The target profit share (m
T
F) in equation (20) is given by mark-up pricing, with the 
mark-up being interest inelastic in the short run, but interest elastic in the long run. If 
there is no economy-wide incomes policy internalizing the macroeconomic 
externalities of wage setting at the firm or industry level, the workers’ target wage 
share (1-m
T
W) in equation (21) rises with the rate of employment, which, for 
simplification, we assume to move in step with the rate of capacity utilization. For 
claims to be consistent, the rate of utilization needs to be at a certain level, which we 
can call the ‘normal’ rate of utilization (un), as described by equation (22), implying a 
NAICU. To further simplify the analysis, we assume adaptive expectations and also 
that firms set prices once nominal wages have been agreed upon in the labour market. 
The latter assumption implies that firms can always realize their income distribution 
target. 
 





























The upper part of Figure 9 shows the well known goods-market equilibrium; in the 
middle part, we have the target wage shares of firms (1-m
T
F) and of workers (1-m
T
W); 
and the lower part of the figure shows the modified Phillips curve with the effects of 
capacity utilization on unexpected inflation, i.e., the change in inflation. With the 
goods market equilibrium at u
*
0 = un (point A), income claims of firms and workers 
are mutually consistent and unexpected inflation is zero. If we start from this position 
and assume a decline in the propensity to save out of rentiers’ income, the g
s curve in 
the upper part of Figure 9 shifts downwards and the goods-market equilibrium moves 
to u
*
1 (point B). Income claims are no longer consistent, and inflation accelerates 
(with adaptive expectations we have positive unexpected inflation in each period). 
According to Duménil and Lévy (1999), central banks will introduce restrictive 
policies, raise interest rates, thus forcing the g
i curve down and stabilising the system 
back to un.  
 
 
3.3.3 Drawbacks of inflation targeting monetary policies 
 
However, things may not be as simple as Duménil and Lévy suppose, once we take 
interest payments and debt into account. First, we need to remember that unexpected 
inflation will feed back on the goods-market equilibrium in the short run. With a 
given nominal interest rate, unexpected inflation will reduce the real interest rate, and 
with credit and bonds not indexed to changes in inflation, the debt-to-capital ratio will 
decline. Taken together, unexpected inflation reduces the real interest payments 
relative to the capital stock (iλ). This redistribution in favour of firms and at the 
expense of rentiers will affect the goods-market equilibrium. In Figure 9, both the g
i 
and the g
s curves will now shift upwards, so that whether this leads to a higher or 
lower rate of capacity utilization u* depends on the parameter values. From equation   20
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, if  z z s γ < − 1 . 
Therefore, if the propensity to consume of rentiers (1-sz) falls short of firms’ 
investment elasticity with respect to interest payments (γz), the income redistribution 
at the expense of rentiers and in favour of firms associated with unexpected inflation 
will stimulate aggregate demand, and u* will move farther away from un. This is 
shown in Figure 9: the upward shift in the g
i curve will exceed the upward shift in the 
g
s curve, and the goods market equilibrium will move to u
*
2 (point C), triggering 
again unexpected inflation, and so on. In this ‘normal case’ regarding the values taken 
by the parameters of the saving and investment function, as Lavoie (1995B) calls it, 
the Duménil and Lévy (and the NCM) monetary policy rule is likely to be successful 
in bringing down the economy back to un. This is because there is no upper limit to 
the real rate of interest that can be imposed by the monetary authorities, who can hike 
up nominal interest rates as high as they please. The increasing real interest payments 
relative to capital force both curves, gi and gs, to shift downwards, with the shift in gi 
exceeding the one in gs. Finally, the economy will be back at un but at a lower 
equilibrium accumulation rate (g*). 
 However,  if  u* < un , while the same parameter conditions outlined in the 
previous paragraph prevail (the ‘normal case’ again), stabilisation around un by means 
of monetary policies cannot be taken for granted. To follow the Duménil and Lévy 
(and NCM) monetary policy rule requires the central bank to reduce the real interest 
rate. In this situation, however, the policy instrument of the central bank – the nominal 
interest rate – has a zero percent floor. Hence, when inflation rates are very low or 
deflation prevails, the monetary authorities may be unable to reduce real rates 
sufficiently to bring back the actual rate of capacity utilization to un. In the ‘normal’ 
parameter case, the stabilising capacities of monetary policies may therefore be 
asymmetric. 
Consider now the other case, the ‘puzzling case’ as Lavoie (1995b) calls it. 







, if  z z s γ > − 1 . If rentiers’ propensity to consume exceeds 
the investment elasticity of firms with respect to interest payments, redistribution at 
the expense of rentiers and in favour of firms associated with unexpected inflation is 
recessionary, and hence moves u* back towards un (the upward shift in the g
i curve 
falls short of the upward shift in the g
s curve). In this ‘puzzling case’, the economic 
system will be self-stabilizing without any monetary policy intervention. Central 
banks following the Duménil and Lévy monetary policy rule will hence disturb or 
even prevent the adjustment process. 
 


































But this is not where the story ends. We need to go beyond the short run, and consider 
the medium- to long-run effects of changes in the real interest rate induced by 
monetary policy reactions geared towards stabilising the system. Take Figure 10 and 
suppose that the ‘normal’ parameter constellation prevails, with actual utilization 
exceeding the normal rate (u
*
2 > un1, point C). Suppose further that monetary policies 
have successfully raised the real interest rate and hence iλ, thus shifting down the g
s 
and the g
i curves, and bringing back the economy to un1 = u
*
0 (point D) in the short 
run, but at an accumulation rate that is lower than the initial one (point D in Figure 10 
is below point A in Figure 9). However, since real interest rates and real interest 
payments relative to capital have increased, firms will raise their target mark-ups in 
the medium to long run. This shifts their target wage share downwards, reduces the 
NAIRU and the ‘normal’ rate of capacity utilization, and shifts the Phillips curve 












Redistribution in favour of profits will also affect the goods market equilibrium. 
Inserting equations (20) and (22) into equation (19) and calculating the long-run 
effects of a change in the iλ ratio on the equilibrium rate of utilization yields an 
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Since we assume m1 to be zero in the short run, but positive in the long run, we obtain 
a long-run effect on capacity utilization (the second term in brackets in the numerator) 
– on top of the short-run effect (the first term in brackets in the numerator). This long-
run effect via redistribution at the expense of labour may be positive or negative – 
depending on the values taken by the parameters (γu, ω1) and depending on initial 
conditions (u*). Only by accident will the new goods market equilibrium u
*
3 (point E) 
in Figure (10) therefore be equal to the new normal rate un2, and further central bank 
interventions may be required. Graphically, this second-round effect of a rise in the 
real interest rate (the increased profit share and a reduced ‘normal’ rate of utilization), 
amounts to an upwards shift of the investment function and a counter-clockwise 
rotation of the saving function in Figure 10. This is not the place to elaborate further 
on the complex interactions between the goods-market equilibrium (u*) and the 
normal rate (un) triggered by unexpected inflation and generated by monetary policy 
interventions.
14 What is important for our present purpose, is that the ‘normal’ rate of 
utilization as understood by Duménil and Lévy gets modified by monetary policy 
interventions. The normal rate is hence endogenous to the actual rate, albeit in an 
indirect and complex way. 
 
 
3.3.4 Fiscal policies – the way out? 
 
The complex feedback processes between the actual rate of utilization and the 
‘normal’ rate inherent to the Duménil and Lévy approach can only be avoided if a 
different economic policy variable is chosen to achieve stabilization. Take the model 
in equations (1A), (2B), (3D), (19) – (22), and assume that fiscal policy, more 
precisely variations in the government deficit relative to the value of the capital stock, 
is the discretionary policy instrument used whenever unexpected inflation or 
disinflation arises, i.e., whenever u* deviates from un. Since autonomous government 
deficit expenditures can be considered to be part of the constant in the investment 
















Therefore, variations in government deficit spending have unique and symmetric 
effects on capacity utilization. As shown in the upper part of Figure 11, a reduction of 
government deficit spending would bring back the economy from u
*
2 to un (from point 
C back to point F) by means of shifting the investment function downwards (in the 
opposite case, u* < un , an increase in government deficit spending and hence an 
upward shift in the investment function would be required). Since in an endogenous 
money world there are no direct feedbacks of government deficits on the interest rate 
– provided central banks do not attempt to interfere with fiscal policies –, variations in 
government deficits do not affect the ‘normal’ rate in equation (22) and in Figure 11. 
In this case, the ‘normal’ rate could hence be considered a strong exogenous attractor, 
                                                 
14 In Hein (2006A, 2008, pp. 153-167) these interactions are analysed in more detail and different cases 
are distinguished: a joint equilibrium un = u* by sheer luck; constant, converging or diverging 
oscillations of un and u*; or monotonic decline of both un and u*.   23
by means of fiscal policy intervention, for the goods market equilibrium rate of 
utilization. Note that point F in Figure 11 is below the initial equilibrium, point A in 



























However, even in the case of adjustment of u* towards an exogenous un by means of 
fiscal policies, the exogeneity of un with respect to u* cannot be taken for granted. As 
discussed in Hein and Stockhammer (2007) in a more complex model than the one 
presented here, there are further channels which affect the NAIRU or the ‘normal’ 
rate of utilization whenever actual unemployment or the goods-market equilibrium 
rate of capacity utilization deviate respectively from these rates. Persistence 
mechanisms in the labour market – previously suggested by New Keynesian authors 
such as Blanchard and Summers (1987, 1988) and Ball (1999) – are relevant to our 
modified Kaleckian model.
15 As shown by wage-bargaining or insider-outsider 
models, persistent unemployment and an increasing share of long-term unemployment 
in total unemployment, with the associated loss of skills and access to jobs by the 
long-term unemployed, will decrease the pressure of a given rate of unemployment on 
the target real wage share of insiders or  labour unions, and hence on nominal wage 
demands. This will then require an increasing total rate of unemployment in order to 
stabilise inflation. Of course, these mechanisms also work in the opposite direction. 
Therefore, whenever u* > un in Figure 11, the curve representing the target wage 
share of workers (1-m
T
W) rotates clockwise, the NAIRU decreases, the Phillips curve 
flattens, and the ‘normal’ rate of utilization increases. When we have u* < un, this 
same target wage share curve rotates anti-clockwise, the NAIRU increases, the 
                                                 
15 In Hein and Stockhammer (2007), apart from labour market persistence mechanisms, there is also a 
discussion of wage aspirations and conventional behaviour, as well as the effect of investment in fixed 
capital on the target profit share of firms.   24
Phillips curve becomes steeper, and the ‘normal’ rate declines, moving towards the 
actual rate of utilization. 
Taken together, under very special conditions, there may exist an economic 
policy mechanism that brings the economy back to un. However, this mechanism is 
not monetary policy; it is instead fiscal policy. And this mechanism requires the 
Phillips curve to be upward sloping, devoid of horizontal segments, and deprived of 
any  endogenous channel moving un towards u*. If there is a horizontal segment in the 
Phillips curve, un is no longer unique and is determined by u* within the range of this 
horizontal segment; consequently, the usual Kaleckian results – the paradox of thrift 
and the paradox of costs – will hold within this range. And if there are market-based 
endogeneity channels – for instance labour market persistence mechanisms – rising or 
falling inflation becomes a temporary problem that will be eliminated by an 
endogenous adjustment of un towards u* in the medium to long run. Hence, Hence, if 
economic policies are satisfied with medium- to long-run price/inflation stability, 
policy intervention turns out to be  unnecessary, and u* determines un. Once again the 
usual Kaleckian results – the paradox of thrift and the paradox of costs – will hold. 
 
 
3.4 The Skott mechanism: Capitalists get scared and shift the investment 
function downwards 
 
Peter Skott is one of the main critics of the Kaleckian investment function and the 
notion of long-run endogeneity of the rate of capacity utilization. In recent papers he 
has argued that the Keynesian/Kaleckian stability condition might hold in the short 
run, but  that it will not in the long run (Skott 2008A, 2008B, 2008C). Therefore, in 
the long run, the simple Kaleckian model suffers from Harrodian instability, as shown 
in equations (9) and (10) and in Figure 5. However, Skott sees this as a real-world 
feature rather than as a drawback of the model. The main remaining task, according to 
Skott, is to develop models which may be locally Harrodian unstable but globally 
stable. Therefore, the task is to find the mechanisms that contain Harrodian instability 
at a certain point in the long run, and Skott discusses some of these mechanisms. 
Skott’s models usually have three different runs:
16 First, there is an ultra short 
run in which the capital stock and output are given, while demand and supply in the 
goods market are adjusted by a fast price mechanism. This mechanism modifies 
income distribution in a Kaldorian way, i.e., excess demand causes rising prices and a 
higher profit share. Secondly, there is a short run, where the capital stock is still given 
(or moves rather slowly), but where output can be adjusted. The rate of capacity 
utilization is thus an endogenous variable in this short run. Thirdly, there is a long run, 
during which firms adjust the capital stock in order to achieve their desired rate of 
capacity utilization. This desired rate may either be a constant or be itself dependent 
on capital accumulation in an inverse way (Skott, 2008C, p. 11). It is this long-run 
adjustment process that may give rise to Harrodian instability around a steady growth 
path.  
Skott (2008C) discusses four variants of a Harrodian model: Labour supply 
may or may not be perfectly elastic, thus giving rise to the ‘dual’ and ‘mature’ 
economies; and the adjustment speed of prices may be faster or slower than the 
adjustment speed of quantities, giving rise to the ‘Kaldor/Marshall’ analysis and to the 
‘Robinson/Steindl’ approach. By crossing over all these, one gets the four variants. 
                                                 
16 See also Skott (1989A, 1989B).   25
However, the underlying assumption, in particular regarding the three ‘model runs’ 
mentioned above, are not always made transparent. In the ‘Kaldor/Marshall analysis’ 
with perfectly elastic labour supply, the relatively faster price adjustment mechanism 
seems to be valid for all three runs, thus preventing Harrodian instability and 
stabilising the system through the Cambridge price mechanism described in Section 
3.1 above. Alternatively, with slow price adjustment (the ‘Robinson/Steindl’ 
approach), stability in the ‘dual economy’ requires a sluggish adjustment of the rate of 
capital accumulation to changes in the profit rate, which implies that the Robinsonian 
stability condition has to hold (see equation (13) in section 3.1). Therefore, this does 
not seem to add anything new to our discussion of the Cambridge adjustment process 
in Section 3.1. 
  In the ‘mature’, labour-constrained economy, as described by Skott, another 
mechanism containing Harrodian instability is supposed to be at work, however.
17 In 
the ‘dual economy’ output expansion was a positive function of the profit share only, 
which means that ultra short-run excess demand triggers rising prices and a rising 
profit share. This then induces firms to increase production in the short run and to 
speed up capital accumulation in the long run. In the ‘mature economy’, however, the 
employment rate is entered as an additional, negative, determinant of the willingness 
of firms to expand their output. Skott’s arguments are as follows. When the economy 
moves beyond un and growth exceeds the (exogenous) growth of labour supply, 
unemployment falls, firms have increasing problems to recruit additional workers, 
workers and labour unions are strengthened vis-à-vis management, workers’ militancy 
increases, monitoring and surveillance costs rise, and hence the overall business 
climate deteriorates. This negative effect of increasing employment finally dominates 
the production decisions of firms, output growth declines, capacity utilization rates 
falls, investment falters, and finally profitability declines. Under certain parameter 
conditions this mechanism gives rise to a limit cycle around the steady growth path 
given by the labour supply growth, marrying Harrodian instability with a stabilising 
Marxian labour-market effect.
18 Since the steady state in this model is given by labour 
supply growth, rising animal spirits or a falling propensity to save only have level 
effects on the growth path but do not affect the steady state growth rate. 
  The integration of a stabilising Marxian labour market effect into our simple 
Kaleckian model in equations (1) – (3) with short-run Harrodian instability in 
equation (10) requires again to add equation (17) to the model: 
 
(17)  () 0 , > − − = χ χ γ Δ n u u . 
 
Formally, this extension is exactly equivalent to the integration of the Duménil and 
Lévy (1999) policy rule introduced into the Kaleckian model in section 3.3. The 
difference, however, is the interpretation of equation (17). Whereas the Duménil and 
Lévy model generates a downward shift in the investment function, as shown in 
Figure 8, through the imposition of a restrictive monetary policy that purports to fight 
inflation, in the Skott model it is capitalists themselves who cause the downward shift 
in the investment function when u* > un.
19 If the unemployment rate falls below its 
                                                 
17 This is true for both Skott’s ‘Kaldor/Marshall’ analysis and his ‘Robinson/Steindl’ approach. 
18 See Skott (1989A, pp. 94-100, 1989B) for an explicit analysis. Skott’s analysis attempts to bring in 
effective demand into Goodwin’s (1967) classical Marxian cycle generated by the direct interaction of 
distribution, accumulation and employment. 
19 Skott’s (2008C) reference to Kalecki (1943) is therefore misleading, because in Kalecki high 
employment gives rise to economic policy interventions designed to protect business, and hence gives   26
steady state value, capitalists reduce output growth, sales growth declines and the 
constant in the investment function (equation (3)) starts to shrink, driving the 
economy towards un. 
  In our view, Skott’s approach also suffers from major problems. These are 
related to the proposed stabilisation process giving rise to the limit cycle, on the one 
hand, and to the determination of the steady growth path, on the other.  
First, in a model describing a capitalist economy – with decentralised decision-
making in a classical competitive environment, where competition between different 
firms is an active process
20 – it is not clear at all why falling unemployment rates, 
accompanied by more powerful workers and labour unions, should induce capitalists 
to reduce output growth in the first place. One would rather be tempted to assume that 
falling unemployment generates rising nominal wage growth, both because the 
bargaining power of labour unions has increased and because capitalists compete for 
scarcer labour resources. This should cause either rising inflation or a falling profit 
share, or both. None of these direct effects, however, are discussed by Skott. In his 
models, a reduction in the profit share is instead the result of falling output growth 
and falling investment. What is also missing in Skott’s models is a discussion of the 
effects of income redistribution on aggregate demand. Output expansion as a positive 
function of the profit share and a negative function of employment seems to be a far 
too simple and seems to exclude Kaleckian results by assumption. 
  If we include conflict inflation as the first possible consequence of 
unemployment falling below some short-run NAIRU associated with the ‘normal’ rate 
of capacity utilization (the NAICU) into our interpretation of the Skott model, we can 
apply to it the critique of the Duménil and Lévy model that we presented in the 
previous section. In the ‘normal’ case of this model, u* will therefore further deviate 
from  un. If we further include into our basic model a radical income distribution 
mechanism, meaning an income redistribution in favour of labour whenever u* > un, 
this will further accelerate aggregate demand and move u* farther away from un, 
because our model is wage-led.
21 Thus the Marxian labour market mechanisms 
intensify Harrodian instability instead of containing it.
22  
  Second, Skott’s assumption that the steady growth path is determined by the 
growth rate of the labour force seems to be questionable, even within his own model. 
If it is conceded that labour supply growth may be endogenous to the employment 
rate, as Skott (2008C, p. 14) does, the implications for the Marxian stabilisation 
mechanism have to be analysed in more detail. If labour supply increases whenever 
u* > un and unemployment approaches some critical level, thus triggering Skott’s 
Marxian stabilising labour market processes, this critical level might not be reached at 
all and stabilisation might not take place. Related consequences would have to be 
analysed taking into account possible further endogeneity channels with respect to un. 
                                                                                                                                            
rise to a political business cycle: “the pressure of […] big business would most probably induce the 
Government to return to the orthodox policy of cutting down the budget deficit” (quoted from Kalecki, 
1971, p. 144).   
20 See Eatwell (1987) and Semmler (1987) for a distinction of Classical and Marxian theories of 
competition from the neoclassical notion of ‘perfect competition’. See also Shaikh (1978, 1980). 
21 A Radical distribution mechanism would stabilise the economy at the ‘normal rate’ if the economy 
were profit-led. This would require a Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) investment function instead of our 
function in equation (3). See Stockhammer (2004) for such a model, as well as Bhaduri (2008) and 
Lavoie (2008). 
22 See Hein and Stockhammer (2007, 2008) for a more detailed discussion in a model in which 
unexpected inflation and redistribution between capital and labour – as well as between rentiers and 
firms – arise simultaneously.   27
3.5 The Shaikh II mechanism: Capitalists have perfect foresight and shift the 
investment function downwards 
 
Finally, we deal with another mechanism that claims to solve the problem of 
Harrodian instability and to bring back classical results. In another recent 
contribution, in line with some of his previous papers, Shaikh (2007B) claims that 
Harrodian instability is not a problem, provided a proper investment equation is being 
used. Shaikh affirms that while the Harrodian approach is a crucial insight, the 
warranted path can be shown to be stable. Shaikh (2007B) makes a distinction 
between the standard Kaleckian investment function, which we have already defined 
as equation (3) and which we repeat here for convenience: 
 
(3)  ( ) 0 , , > − + = u n u
i u u g γ γ γ γ . 
 
and the Hicksian stock-flow investment adjustment equation, which he defines as: 
 
(3E)  () 0 , , > − + = u y n u y
i g u u g g γ γ , 
 
where gy is the rate of growth of output, by contrast with g
i which is the rate of 
accumulation or the growth rate of capital (and also the growth rate of capacity, 
assuming away any change in the capital to capacity ratio). 
Shaikh assumes the existence of a Kaleckian/Keynesian mechanism, whereby sales 
are equal to output within the period, so that the growth rate of sales and the growth 
rate of output are identical. Because we know that, by definition, as long as we 
exclude any change in the capital to capacity ratio (v),   
 
(23)  u g gy ˆ + = , 
 
it follows that: 
 
(24)  () n u u u u − − = γ ˆ . 
 
Thus, with investment equation (3E), the rate of utilization converges towards its 
normal value un, since the derivative of equation (24) with respect to u is negative. 
The Harrodian instability problem would thus be avoided through the use of 
investment equation (3E). Dynamic stability is shown on the top part of Figure 12. 
 





















How do the Kaleckian and the Hicksian investment functions get distinguished from 
each other? We shall see that the mechanisms at work and the informational 
requirements are quite different. 
  Take the case of a shock to an economy that would be sitting at a fully-
adjusted position, at a rate of utilization un, as in Figure 12. Suppose there is a shock 
to this economy that could arise from a decrease in the propensity to save out of 
profits sp. The saving function rotates downward. We assume that in the short run 
there is no change in the rate of accumulation decided by entrepreneurs. Thus starting 
from a situation with balanced growth, with the rate of growth of output being equal 
to the rate of growth of capital, gy0  = gk0, the higher level of aggregate demand 
translates itself into a higher rate of capacity utilization, which moves from un to u1. 
Thus, during this transition, the rate of growth of output rises above the rate of growth 
of capacity, as can be guessed from equation (3E).  
  In the Kaleckian model, this short-run result would be followed by further 
increases in the rates of growth and in the rate of capacity utilization. In the new long-
run equilibrium, the growth rate of accumulation would adjust to the growth rate of 
demand, such that both growth rates would reach gkal  in Figure 12. As to the rate of 
utilization, it would rise further, finally reaching ukal. Thus during the transition 
towards the long-run Kaleckian equilibrium, we would have the following 
inequalities, gy > gk > γ.  
  It should be noted that in the Kaleckian model the informational requirements 
are very weak. The rate of accumulation is determined by the current values of the 
rate of utilization, but it would make no difference whatsoever if it were determined 
by past values of the rate of utilization. Also, as pointed out earlier, the rate of 
accumulation depends on some assessed normal rate of growth. As long as this value 
γ is set as a constant, no Harrodian instability problem can arise. One can imagine that 
firms set a rate of accumulation of capacity at the beginning of the year, on the basis   29
of the assessed growth norm and based on past rates of capacity utilization. Then, in 
the course of the year, they adjust output, equating it to aggregate demand. 
  Things are completely different in the case of the Hicksian investment function 
proposed by Shaikh. Firms must know the value of the current growth rate of output, 
and hence the current growth rate of sales, that is gy, when they make their investment 
decisions and hence set g. They must also know the current rate of capacity 
utilization. They must make no mistakes. For if they do, as shown by Skott (2008A, p. 
25) – say because they base their estimates of the current growth rate of sales on past 
growth rates, as they would if they behave in an adaptive manner – then the Hicksian 
stabilizing mechanism won’t work and the model becomes unstable. In other words, 
there is a kind of saddle path equilibrium, as in the neoclassical models with rational 
expectations. In a sense, this is not surprising, since firms with investment equation 
(3E) must be endowed with perfect foresight, being able to correctly assess future 
growth rates of sales, while making them coherent with their investment decisions, 
something that can only be possible if firms have a full understanding of the 
underlying structure of the economy. The informational requirements are thus huge, 
relative to those of the Kaleckian model, because the growth rate of sales depends on 
what all other firms are doing, as also pointed out by Palumbo and Trezzini (2003, p. 
119) in their critique of Shaikh-like adjustments towards fully-adjusted positions. 
Hence, there is a coordination problem, which is swept away by Shaikh.  
  How the Shaikh model functions is illustrated with Figure 12. Suppose that the 
economy has reached the rate of utilization u1 following the reduction in the 
propensity to save. As the top of the figure shows, this is only consistent with a 
reduction in future rates of capacity utilization. Despite the fact that the growth rate of 
sales during the transition that led to the rate u1 has exceeded the initial growth rate of 
the economy (gk0 = gy0), the investment function is such that entrepreneurs must now 
expect a growth rate of sales and output which is lower than this initial growth rate, 
implying that the investment function in our graph must now shift down. This last step 
is a bit hard to swallow. 
  If entrepreneurs were to expect a higher growth rate of sales than the initial 
rate (higher than gy0) the investment function would need to shift up. But then the 
investment function could only intersect the saving function at a rate of utilization 
higher than u1. It would contradict the shape of investment function (3E), as well as 
the top part of Figure 12 since the rate of accumulation (g) must exceed the rate of 
growth of sales and since the rate of utilization must decrease when it is above its 
normal value. 
  Thus, the investment function must shift down, and hence the expected rate of 
growth of sales of the current period must be lower than the initial rate of growth gy0. 
In Figure 12, we have a possible transitional equilibrium, where the rate of capacity 
utilization is brought down to u2, while the growth rate of sales and output falls down 
to  gy2, with the rate of accumulation dropping from gk0 to gk2, with gk2  > g y2, as 
required by the algebra of equation (3E). This process will continue until the rate of 
capacity utilization is brought back to its normal level, un, at which point all growth 
rates – of capacity, sales, output – will be brought down to gk3 = gy3. Thus Figure 12 
corresponds to the time-series shown in Figure 1 of Shaikh (2007B). 
  With his so-called Hicksian stock-flow adjustment mechanism, which we call 
the Shaikh II adjustment mechanism, Shaikh (2007B, p. 8) claims that the Harrodian 
‘warranted path can be perfectly stable’. In addition, the mechanism is such that 
although Keynesian or Kaleckian effects can be observed in the short run, in the long 
run the economy behaves in a classical way. A lower propensity to save, or a lower   30
normal profit rate (higher real wages), both lead to a lower rate of accumulation in the 
long run, with the rate of utilization coming back to its normal level. Thus in the long 
run, at u = un, the rate of accumulation is simply determined by equation (18), and 
hence g** = sprn. There is no paradox of thrift anymore in the long run, and neither is 
there any paradox of costs. Thus, Shaikh can conclude, as Duménil and Lévy (1999) 
have, that economists ought to be Keynesian for the short run but of classical 




4. Short-run Harrodian (or Keynesian) instability and long-run (incomplete) 
adjustments of actual and normal rates of utilization: Paradox of thrift and costs 
still valid? 
 
4.1 Questioning the necessity of any adjustment 
 
So far, we have dealt with mechanisms that intended to bring back the economy 
towards the normal rate of capacity utilization, assuming that this normal rate was 
given and unique. Not all post-Keynesians would agree, however, that normal rates of 
utilization are unique.
23 Neither would all post-Keynesians agree that economic 
analysis must be conducted under the restriction that some mechanism brings back the 
economy towards normal rates of utilization. 
  Chick and Caserta (1997), among others, have argued that expectations and 
behavioural parameters, as well as norms, are changing so frequently that long-run 
analysis, defined as fully-adjusted positions at normal rates of capacity utilization, is 
not a very relevant activity. Instead, they argue that economists should focus on short-
run analysis and what they call medium-run or provisional equilibria. They are 
defined as arising from the equality between investment and saving, or between 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply. These short-run and medium-run equilibria 
are what we have defined as the u
K and u* equilibrium values of the rate of utilization 
in section 2.  
  There is another post-Keynesian way out, to avoid the need to examine 
mechanisms that would bring rates of utilization back to their normal value. As 
pointed out by Palumbo and Trezzini (2003, p. 128), Kaleckian authors tend to argue 
that ‘the notion of “normal” or “desired” utilization should be defined more flexibly 
as a range of degrees rather than as a single value’. Under this interpretation, the 
normal rate of capacity utilization is more a conventional norm than a strict target, and 
hence firms may be quite content to run their production capacity at rates of 
utilization that are within an acceptable range of the normal rate of utilization. If this 
is correct, provisional equilibria could be considered as long-run fully-adjusted 
positions, as long as the rate of capacity utilization remains within the acceptable 
range. Indeed, John Hicks himself seems to have endorsed such a viewpoint. He 
points out that: 
 
‘The stock adjustment principle, with its particular desired level of stocks, is 
itself a simplification. It would be more realistic to suppose that there is a range 
                                                 
23 Some critics of the Kaleckian model also believe that the normal rate of utilization may not be 
unique. For instance, Skott (1989A, p. 54) argues that the normal rate of utilization is set based on an 
entry deterrence strategy, such that high net profit margins induce the adoption of a low desired rate of 
capacity utilization.   31
or interval, within which the level of stock is “comfortable”, so that no special 
measures seem called for to change it. Only if the actual level goes outside that 
range will there be a reaction.’ (Hicks, 1974, p. 19) 
 
Also, as long as rates of utilization remain within the acceptable range, firms may 
consider discrepancies between the actual and the normal rates of utilization as a 
transitory rather than a permanent phenomenon. As a consequence, the Harrodian 
instability mechanism, which would induce firms to act along the lines of equation 
(10), with accelerating accumulation when actual utilization rates surpass the normal 
rate, might be very slow, getting implemented only when entrepreneurs are persuaded 
that the discrepancy is persisting. Given real-world uncertainty and the fact that 
capital decisions are irreversible to a large extent, firms may be very prudent, so that 
the Harrodian instability may not be a true concern in actual economies.  
  A further point needs to be made. Some authors, such as Skott (1989A) have 
argued that if firms behave along profit-maximizing lines, there will be a unique 
profit-maximizing rate of capacity utilization (for a normal profit rate), corresponding 
to the optimal choice of technique. Now, as Caserta (1990, p. 151) points out, reserve 
capacity can be understood in at least two different meanings. Kurz (1986), who is 
often cited as a reference for those insisting on normal capacity use, studies reserve 
capacity in the first sense, meaning the duration or the intensity of operation of a plant 
during a day. What Kaleckians have in mind is instead idle capacity, as defined in 
statistical surveys of capacity use. They believe that each plant or segment of plant is 
operated at its most efficient level of output per unit of time; however, some plants or 
segments of plants are not operated at all. Firms are cost minimizers, but they have 
little control over the rate of capacity utilization as defined here.
24 It is telling to note 
that Kurz (1994, p. 414), when studying reserve capacity in the second sense, 
concludes that ‘it is virtually impossible for the investment-saving mechanism … to 
result in an optimal degree of capacity utilization’. He even adds that ‘it is, rather, 
expected, that the economy will generally exhibit smaller or larger margins of 
unutilized capacity over and above the difference between full and optimal capacity’. 
Elsewhere, Kurz (1993, p. 102) insists that ‘one must keep in mind that although each 
entrepreneur might know the optimal degree of capacity utilization, this is not enough 
to insure that each of them will be able to realize this optimal rate’.
25  
  This being said, although we believe the above statements represent strong 
arguments, we do not wish to ‘sweep the problem of the long run relevance of 
Kaleckian models under the carpet’ (Commendatore, 2006, p. 289). We recognize the 
relevance of the concerns of those economists who object to provisional Kaleckian 
equilibria as the final word. These critics of the Kaleckian model argue that the 
normal rate of capacity utilization is a stock-flow norm (Shaikh, 2007B, p. 6), linking 
the stock of capital with the production flow, and that entrepreneurs should act in such 
a way that the norm ought to be realized. There are however other norms that are not 
necessarily realized, despite the best efforts of economic agents. For instance, the 
propensities to save out of income and wealth determine a wealth to income stock-
flow norm for consumers, but this norm is never exactly achieved in a growing 
economy (Godley and Lavoie, 2007, p. 98). Neither is the inventories to sales ratio. 
Thus it is not a foregone conclusion that norms ought to be realized in the long run 
within a coherent framework. 
                                                 
24 Cf. Lavoie (1992, p. 328). 
25 This passage is translated from the French.   32
However, besides the mechanisms that we identified and criticized in the previous 
section, are there some other mechanisms, more akin to post-Keynesian economics, 
that could be uncovered and that could tackle the possible discrepancy between actual 
and normal rates of utilization, the latter understood as target rates of firms? This is 
the subject of the remainder of this section. 
 
 
4.2 Goods and labour market reactions stabilise the system I: Entrepreneurs 
adjust their assessment of the normal rate of capacity utilization  
 
While Marxist or classical economists would argue that the actual rate of capacity 
utilization needs to tend towards the normal rate, a possible alternative is to reverse 
the causality of the mechanism, and argue instead that the normal rate of capacity 
utilization tends towards the actual rate. As Park (1997, p. 96) puts it, ‘the degree of 
utilization that the entrepreneurs concerned conceive as “normal” is affected by the 
average degree of utilization they experienced in the past’. Indeed, Joan Robinson has 
herself argued that normal rates of profit and of capacity utilization were subjected to 
adaptive adjustment processes, as the following quote shows: 
 
‘Where fluctuations in output are expected and regarded as normal, 
the subjective-normal price may be calculated upon the basis of an 
average or standard rate of output, rather than capacity. [...] profits 
may exceed or fall short of the level on the basis of which the 
subjective-normal prices were conceived. Then experience gradually 
modifies the views of entrepreneurs about what level of profit is 
obtainable, or what the average utilization of plant is likely to be 
over its lifetime, and so reacts upon subjective-normal prices for the 
future.’ (Robinson, 1956, pp. 186, 190) 
 
We can imagine various adaptive mechanisms that take into account both the 
flexibility of the normal degree of capacity utilization and the Harrodian instability 
principle. One possible mechanism deals only with the investment function, and was 
investigated by Lavoie (1995A, pp. 807-8; 1996). The γ parameter in investment 
function (3) is often interpreted as the secular growth rate of the economy, or the 
expected growth rate of sales. Firms are then interpreted as speeding up accumulation, 
relative to this secular growth rate, when current capacity utilization exceeds the 
target, thus trying to catch up. One would also think that the expected trend growth 
rate is influenced by past values of the actual growth rate. With normal rates of 
capacity utilization also being influenced by past actual rates, the two dynamic 
equations are given by: 
 
(25) 0 ), * ( > − = σ σ Δ n n u u u , 
(26)  0 ), * ( > − = Ω γ Ω γ Δ g . 
 


















































We now have a continuum of equilibria, such that Δun = Δγ = 0, shown in Figure 13, 
and which corresponds to the long-run equilibrium: 
 
(27)  * * * * * * * * n p n u
v
m
s u g = = = α γ  
 
With a decrease in the propensity to save sp, or with a decrease in the profit margin m, 
the continuum of long-run equilibria rotates downward, and two cases arise. When 
dynamic equations (25) and (26) describe a stabilizing process, the normal rate of 
utilization and the perceived growth trend rise up to a point such as AS in Figure 13. 
The paradoxes of thrift and of costs thus still hold, even in the fully-adjusted positions. 
The dynamic process, however, may be unstable, as shown by arrowhead AU. The 
process will be stable provided the transitional path has a smaller slope than that of 
the new demarcation line, that is provided we have dγ/dun = Ωγu/σ < α, which means 
that spm/v > (Ω/σ)γu. If the Keynesian stability condition given by equation (5) holds, 
then a sufficient condition for dynamic stability is simply σ > Ω. In other words, the 
Harrodian instability effect, represented by equation (26) which tells us that   34
entrepreneurs will raise their expectations about future growth rates whenever current 
realized growth rates exceed the current trend estimate, must not be too large.
26 
  An interesting characteristic of the present model is that it features what 
Setterfield (1993) calls deep endogeneity or hysteresis. The new fully-adjusted 
position depends on the previous fully-adjusted position. Very clearly, it also depends 
on the reaction parameters during the transition or traverse process, and hence we may 
also say that it is path-dependent, leading Lavoie (1995A, p. 807) to speak of a 
‘possibility devoid of definite solutions’.
27 In contrast to what Commendatore (2006, 
p. 289) claims, we do not believe that ‘the Keynesian nature of the analysis is severely 
reduced’ with the adoption of these dynamic equations. An increase in the animal 
spirits of the entrepreneurs or in their expectations with regards to the future growth 
of sales would be reflected in an upward shift of the γ parameter, which would drive 
the economy along the B arrow in Figure 13. 
  A few other similar models, with an endogenous normal rate of capacity 
utilization, have been constructed. Dutt (1997) has equations that turn out to be 
similar to equations (25A) and (26A), but they are based on an entry deterrence 
mechanism.
28 Lavoie (1996) also considers a model where the mechanisms of 
equations (25) and (26) are extended to the pricing equation, a suggestion that seems 
to be approved by Park (1997). A two-sector version is investigated by Kim (2006), 
who finds that the paradox of thrift still holds. Perhaps the most complete model is 
that of Cassetti (2006), where the trend growth rate γ, the normal rate of capacity 
utilization un, and the normal profit rate rn are all endogenized, reacting to their past 
values, while in addition the rate of capital scrapping gets speeded up as long as the 
actual rate of capacity utilization lies below its normal rate.
29 Cassetti also finds 
hysteresis effects, with the saving paradox prevailing, while the paradox of costs may 
or may not occur in fully-adjusted positions.  
  Another Kaleckian model with endogenous normal rates of utilization is that 
of Commendatore (2006), which involves non-linear changes in profit margins in a 
discrete-time framework. Commendatore shows that, at least for some parameter 
values, the average rate of utilization will be quite different from the initial normal 
rate of utilization, with aggregate demand thus playing an important role even in the 
long run. This is thus the lesson that can be drawn from all these models with 
endogenous normal rates of capacity utilization: high animal spirits and low 
propensities to save do have a positive long-run effect on the economy, while the 
paradox of costs may or may not hold. 
 
                                                 
26 This is an assumption ususally made by Sraffian authors, for instance Committeri (1986, p. 179). 
27 Kaldor (1934, p. 125), who from the beginning was unhappy with comparative static analysis, 
defines path-dependent equilibria as ‘indeterminate’ equilibria. Unstable equilibria in his terminology 
are ‘indefinite’ equilibria.   
28 Dutt’s (1997) mechanism is criticized by Skott (2008A, p. 13), who questions the sign of equation 
(25A) and whether a differential equation is relevant to an entry deterrence strategy.  
29 Cassetti’s equation can be said to be based on an argument of Steindl (1979, p. 6), according to 
which ‘a high growth rate and high utilisation will tend to retard withdrawal of equipment … a low 
growth rate and utilisation will lead to some premature withdrawal of equipment’. Similarly, Allain and 
Canry (2008) argue that low rates of capacity utilization will lead to more bankruptcies, which entail 
extensive capital scrapping and hence a reduction of the available capacity. As a result, demand will be 
spread over a reduced available capacity (that of the surviving firms), thus tending to reduce the 
discrepancy between measured rates of capacity utilization and their normal value. In addition, as 
argued by researchers in behavioural economics, normal rates of capacity utilization may act as an 
attractor. When measures of rates of capacity utilization arise from surveys, there may be a tendency 
for firms to give answers that do not stray too far from what they consider to be the ‘normal’ value.   35
 
4.3 Goods and labour market reactions stabilise the system II: Firms have 
multiple targets the realisation of which may be mutually exclusive  
 
Critics of the Kaleckian model (e.g., Auerbach and Skott, 1988; Skott, 2008A; 
Shaikh, 2007) have repeatedly argued that the normal rate of capacity utilization 
should be treated as a definite target for firms and that deviations from it should not 
affect the target itself. Skott (2008A, p. 11) maintains that ‘adjustments in the target 
would only be justified if the experience of low actual utilization make firms think 
that low utilization has now become optimal’. 
  As seen above, one response by Kaleckians has been to maintain that firms do 
indeed take past values of capacity utilization as a reference point for their 
formulation of the normal rate. However, another line of response to the ‘Classical 
challenge’ is possible and has initially been considered by Lavoie (1992, pp. 417-421, 
2002, 2003). It has recently been spelled out more explicitly and extended by Dallery 
and van Treeck (2008). The idea is to treat the normal rate of capacity utilization as a 
fixed target of firms, while recognizing that firms also have various other important 
objectives, the realization of which may not necessarily coincide with the realization 
of the utilization target. Hence, firms need to trade off the utilization rate target with 
other targets.  
  Dallery and van Treeck (2008) start out by structuring their discussion of 
conflicting claims by different stakeholders of the firm in terms of target rates of 
return. Two conflicts surround the target or ‘normal’ profit rate. The first conflict 
involves shareholders and managers, who oppose each others in the determination of 
the accumulation policies of firms. This conflict arises from the notion of a growth-
profit trade-off faced by the individual firm: fast expansion can only be obtained at 
the cost of lower profitability, due to the costs involved with discovering new 
products, entering into new markets, etc. (Penrose, 1959; Wood, 1975; Lavoie, 1992, 
pp. 114-116). As is traditionally assumed in the post-Keynesian theory of the firm 
(Galbraith, 1967; Wood, 1975), managers mainly seek growth, as a means to ensure 
the firm’s survival by increasing its power and limiting uncertainty. By contrast, 
shareholders seek profitability, for intuitive reasons. Because they hold diversified 
portfolios, they are not really committed to the long-term perspectives and the 
survival of individual firms (Crotty, 1990).  
  The target rate of return of firms can be derived as a weighted average of the 
profitability target formulated by shareholders, rsh, and the profit rate, rsm, that 
corresponds to the growth target formulated by managers, for a given technology and 
a given growth-profit trade-off. We thus have:  
 
(28)   sm sh sf r r r ) 1 ( 1 1 δ δ − + = ,   1 0 1 ≤ ≤δ . 
 
Based on these considerations, a general investment function can be formulated:  
 
(3F)  u r g sf
i
3 2 1 0 γ λ γ γ γ + − − = , 
 
where the rate of accumulation depends negatively on the debt ratio (λ) and on the rate 
of return (rsf) being required of firms, and positively on the rate of capacity utilization. 
  Dallery and van Treeck (2008) consider two polar cases. In the first 
constellation, shareholders are fully dominant (δ1 = 1 in equation (3F)) and investment   36
is fully constrained by the shareholders’ preference for profitability and by demand 
conditions (γ2 = 0). In the second constellation, managers are fully dominant (δ1 = 0) 
and growth is the primary objective, while being constrained by the availability of 
finance, which is influenced by the debt ratio and by demand conditions (γ1 = 0).  
  The second conflict around the target rate of return involves firms 
(shareholders and managers) on the one hand, and workers on the other. It concerns 
the distribution of income between profits and wages. Applying the standard 
framework for target-return pricing, firms achieve the normal rate of profit, rn, 
whenever the rate of capacity utilization is at its normal level, un (here assumed to be 
exogenous). This is clearly seen in equation (1): 
 
(1)  n n u u r r / = . 
 
However, because workers have some bargaining power, firms are not able to 
incorporate their profitability (or accumulation) target, given by rsf, into prices. 
Rather, the rate of return actually incorporated into prices, denoted by rn, results from 
a compromise between firms and workers. The rate rn is not the target rate of return of 
firms; rather it is the rate of profit that firms would manage to achieve if their sales 
were to correspond to production at the normal rate of capacity utilization. This 
newly-defined normal rate of profit is given as follows: 
 
(29)  ( ) sw sf n r r r 2 2 1 δ δ − + = ,   1 0 2 ≤ ≤δ . 
 
Obviously, it can be seen by inspecting equations (1) and (29) that only one of two 
targets, either the utilization target, un, or the target rate of return of firms, rsf, 
generally can be achieved, while the other target will not. Sales corresponding to the 
normal rate of capacity utilization, at u = un, allow the realisation of the profitability 
objectives of the firms (r = rsf) if and only if there is no conflict over income 
distribution (rn = rsf = rsw). As soon as workers have some bargaining power (δ2 < 1) 
and rsf > rn > rsw, firms have to operate at rates above the normal rate of capacity 
utilization (u > un) in order to reach their profitability objective (r = rsf).  
It should not be surprising that in a complex and conflictual economic system, 
objectives may not all be realized even in long-run equilibrium.
30 However, it also 
follows from the analysis above that the profitability (accumulation) target of firms 
and the income distribution target of workers can be partly reconciled with each other, 
as long as the rate of utilization is treated as an accommodating variable. The reason 
for this is that the two profit rates given by rsf and rn are of a very different nature. 
                                                 
30 Skott (2008B, p. 10) argues against the adjustment of normal to actual utilization, as discussed in the 
previous subsection, by means of the following analogy. ‘Imagine that over a period I am late for class 
every day because of a series of minor mishaps (a flat tire one day, followed by a snow storm the next 
day, road works, a traffic accident at a key intersection, ...). I do not respond to this unfortunate string 
of events by adjusting my planned arrival time in the way suggested by Lavoie: I may have been late 
for class (have had too little actual ‘commuting capacity’) because of unforeseen shocks but that does 
not make being late seem desirable. In this simple example, nothing prevents me from adjusting my 
departure time in the direction that I consider optimal (disregarding random shocks; the phone may ring 
just as I’m about to leave or ...), and by leaving earlier I should get to class on time.’ Whatever the 
validity of this analogy, one may easily imagine a situation where students will adjust, by also arriving 
late, so that both students and the professor will arrive at the same time. Moreover, it may be that the 
professor systematically arrives late for class not as a result of minor mishaps or unforeseen shocks, but 
rather because he or she is prevented from choosing an ideal departure time due to conflicting and 
equally important objectives, which may be enforced by other individuals.    37
While the realisation of rsf depends on aggregate demand conditions, rn can be 
translated into a profit or wage share that is independent of demand. The aggregate 
demand constraint results from the combination of equation (3F) with a saving 
function that incorporates retained earnings, such as equation (2A). 
Given our assumption that managers seek to maximize growth, while 
shareholders are primarily interested in the rate of profit, we may treat r = rsf as the 
long-run equilibrium condition, and propose two alternative equilibrium adjustment 
processes: 
 
(30) ) * ( 1 sf sf r r r − = ρ Δ , 
 
(31)   *) ( 2 r r s sf f − − = ρ Δ . 
 
Equation (30) has been proposed by Lavoie (1992, p. 490). Dallery and van Treeck 
(2008) have argued that it may be relevant for a manager-dominated firm, where firms 
maximize growth and ‘shareholders play a purely passive role’ (δ1 = 0), as was 
traditionally assumed in the post-Keynesian theory of the firm (Lavoie, 1992, p. 107). 
In such a case, when firms observe that actual profitability increases as a result of 
higher demand, they adjust their target rate of return upwards because a higher profit 
rate is needed to finance a higher accumulation rate. Throughout this process, firms 
claim a larger profit share (mark-up), but their preference for higher growth also 
requires an increase in the rate of utilization, due to real wage resistance by workers. 
As noted by Lavoie (2002, 2003) and Missaglia (2007, p. 79), the adjustment process 
described by equation (31) is stable because  0 / < s dr dr  as long as the propensity to 
consume out of wages is higher than out of profits and the economy is wage-led. 
By contrast, equation (31), which looks similar to the adjustment process 
proposed by Shaikh (2007A) (see equation (15) above), may be relevant for the 
second constellation, namely that of the shareholder-dominated firm (δ1 = 1). In this 
case, firms formulate a profitability target (rather than an accumulation target), and 
shareholders firmly expect this target to be met. According to equation (31), when the 
actual profit rate is below the target, managers will react by increasing the share of 
profits distributed to shareholders (dividends, share buybacks), given by (1-sf), where 
sf is the retention rate.
31 An intuitive explanation is that managers aim to support 
shareholder value and to signal to shareholders that they are confident with regards to 
the future profit opportunities of firms. As shown by Dallery and van Treeck (2008), 
this will, under certain conditions,
32 boost the actual profit rate, because of the 
increased consumption out of profits. In this case, although the rate of profit is a 
predetermined variable, the utilization rate remains endogenous in the long run.  
The main conclusion of this subsection is that in a world where different groups 
within the firm have different objectives, the equality of actual and normal rates of 
                                                 
31 Charles (2008) also suggests that the retention ratio of firms should be treated as an endogenous 
variable. There, managers target some level of the retention ratio in order ‘to preserve their financial 
autonomy’ (p. 9). When debt increases, managers cut dividends and increase their retention ratio in 
order to control uncertainty. In equation (31) above, the causality is reversed: under the pressure of 
shareholder value orientation, managers are obliged to distribute more dividends by means of 
increasing debt. 
32 In the presence of strong liquidity constraints, an increase in the distribution of profits may have 
overall contractive effects and may thus further depress demand and hence profitability, thereby 
rendering the mechanism in equation (31) unstable.    38
capacity utilization should not be treated as the (only possible) long-run equilibrium 
condition. On the contrary, the long-run endogeneity of the utilization rate helps to 
reconcile the conflicting claims of capitalists and workers. As shown by Lavoie 
(2002, 2003) and Dallery and van Treeck (2008), the paradox of costs may indeed 





The purpose of the preceding analysis has been to tackle the issue of the possible 
instability of the Kaleckian distribution and growth model, as well as the 
consequences for the paradoxes of thrift and of costs and for the endogeneity of the 
equilibrium rate of capacity utilization. We have carefully distinguished between 
Keynesian and Harrodian instability but argued that, at the empirical level, these two 
problems may be hard to disentangle in practice. Therefore, we have focused on 
Harrodian instability in our analysis. 
Based on a simple Kaleckian model, we have allowed for Harrodian 
instability, i.e., an increase in the rate of accumulation as long as the actual rate of 
capacity utilization is above its normal rate. We have discussed various mechanisms, 
and their objections, that have been proposed to tame Harrodian instability and to 
bring back the rate of utilization in line with its unique normal rate. We have argued 
that the Cambridge price mechanism, initially advocated by Nicholas Kaldor and Joan 
Robinson, is not generally convincing as a stabiliser, because in mature economies – 
to borrow a label from Peter Skott – lower real wages (or higher profit shares with 
given technology) bargained by workers and labour unions can hardly square with the 
low unemployment rates and more powerful labour unions that are associated with 
utilization rates exceeding the normal rate. A Radical price and distribution 
mechanism, i.e., rising real wages enforced by strong labour unions, or a price-wage-
price spiral, hence Joan Robinson’s ‘inflation barrier’, are more likely. The Radical 
price and distribution mechanism would bring our model farther away from the 
‘normal rate’, and accelerating inflation would require the introduction of economic 
policy responses into the model, as proposed in the model by Gérard Duménil and 
Dominique Lévy.  
A careful evaluation of the Duménil and Lévy mechanism, i.e., monetary 
policies aiming at price/inflation stability which bring back the economy to the 
normal rate of utilization, however, has shown that this cannot be taken for granted as 
soon as distribution effects of unexpected inflation and of changes in the monetary 
policy instrument, the interest rate, are taken into account. In particular the interest 
rate has an influence both on the actual and on the normal rate of utilization. The 
normal rate as understood by Duménil and Lévy – a NAICU – is hence affected by 
the actual goods market equilibrium rate of utilization via monetary policy 
interventions, and the former becomes endogenous to the latter, albeit in an indirect 
and complex way. We have argued that this endogeneity can be avoided, if 
government fiscal deficits are instead applied as an economic policy instrument. 
However, there may be other forces at work, which make the normal rate endogenous 
with regards to the actual rate of utilization in an economic policy framework: a 
horizontal segment in the Phillips curve or the adjustment of the ‘normal’ to the actual 
rate via labour-market persistence or other mechanisms. Therefore, the role of labour   39
market institutions and economic policies in the Kaleckian model should be further 
explored.
33 
Apart from economic policies as a stabiliser in the face of Harrodian instability 
we have also considered models which suppose that instability is contained or even 
prevented by the behaviour of capitalist firms. Anwar Shaikh’s models either assume 
that firms increase their retention rate as soon as utilization exceeds its normal rate, 
thus leading to an increase in the overall saving rate and bringing back the economic 
system to the normal rate of utilization. Harrodian instability is thus contained. 
However, the economic rationale for such behaviour is far from obvious. In an 
alternative model, Shaikh assumes that firms reduce their investment as soon as the 
expected growth rate of sales exceeds the long-run normal rate. Harrodian instability 
is hence avoided and utilization is always at the normal rate. However, this kind of 
behaviour requires rational expectations on the side of the firms – firms have to know 
the growth rate of sales when making their investment decisions, but this rate is 
determined by the actual investment rate of other firms. There is thus a coordination 
problem, which is swept away by Shaikh in this model.  
In Peter Skott’s models of a ‘mature economy’, Harrodian instability is 
bounded by a Marxian labour market mechanism which generates a limit cycle around 
the steady growth path determined by labour force growth. Capitalists reduce output 
growth as soon as utilization exceeds the normal rate, unemployment falls, and the 
unemployment rate approaches some critical value. But this behavioural assumption 
also lacks plausibility when applied to a decentralised capitalist market economy 
characterised by competitive pressures. We have hence argued that a Radical income 
distribution effect or accelerating inflation are the more likely outcomes, and with 
these stabilisation around a predetermined and unique normal rate is not warranted. 
Since the mechanisms that have been proposed to tame Harrodian instability 
while bringing back the rate of utilization in line with its predetermined normal rate 
are far from being convincing, we have finally reviewed some approaches arguing 
that the adjustment towards a predetermined ‘normal’ rate should not be expected at 
all. These approaches include the proposition that a fully-adjusted position should not 
be expected in the real world because expectations and behavioural parameters, as 
well as norms, are changing so frequently that long-run analysis, defined as fully-
adjusted positions at normal rates of capacity utilization, is not a very relevant 
exercise. Although this may be a vital point, we have argued that in a sense it 
circumvents the Harrodian challenge. Consequently, we have reviewed how the latter 
can be dealt with in two other ways that allow for retaining the basic characteristics of 
the Kaleckian model. The first one is that the firm’s perception of the trend rate of 
growth and of the normal rate of utilization may be path-dependent and hence may be 
both affected by actual rates of growth and capacity utilization. The second one is that 
firms may have additional targets, besides the normal utilization of productive 
capacity, and the realisation of these objectives may be mutually exclusive. The 
review of these approaches has shown that major results of the Kaleckian model can 
be retained in a more complex setting than the one provided by the simple textbook 
model. 
Although we do not pretend that our review so far has been exhaustive, we 
hope to have shown that the summary statements that claim that one may be 
‘Keynesian in the short run’ but needs to be ‘Classical in the long run’, as Duménil 
                                                 
33 Recently there has been some work done in this area which can be used as a starting point. See for 
example Hein and Stockhammer (2007, 2008), Isaac (2008), Rochon and Setterfield (2007), Setterfield 
(2008).   40
and Lévy as well as Shaikh argue, are rather premature. It also seems premature to 
argue, as Skott (2008C, p. 22) does, that ‘the current dominance of the Kaleckian 
model (…) is unfortunate’ for post-Keynesian and Structuralist macroeconomics. 
Kaleckian models are more flexible than the Classical and Marxian critics suppose 
when attacking the simple textbook version. Deviations of actual from normal rates of 
utilization and behavioural as well as political responses towards this deviation can be 
included into these models without necessarily doing away with an endogenous rate 
of utilization, the paradox of thrift and the paradox of costs in the long.  
Of course, these models have to be further developed, as we would also like to 
insist. Areas of further development should include a more in-depth study of the role 
of economic policies and labour market institutions. Also, in light of what has 
occurred since August 2007, financial instability arising from the behaviour of the 
banking sector should certainly be given more attention. Finally, the role of the 
growth of labour supply and potential endogeneity channels with regards to the so-
called ‘natural rate’ of growth have to be investigated and the relationship between 
pro-cyclical profit shares, as observed empirically, and medium- to long-run wage-led 
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